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 “Problems cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them.” 
 —Albert Einstein 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes the feasibility of a second-order approach in cosmology. It is intended to 
encourage cosmologists to rethink standard ideas in their field, leading to a broader concept of 
self-organization and of science itself. It is argued, from a cognitive epistemology perspective, 
that a first-order approach is inadequate for cosmology; study of the universe as a whole must 
include study of the scientific observer and the process of theorizing. Otherwise, concepts of self-
organization at the cosmological scale remain constrained by unacknowledged assumptions and 
biases. Examples of limiting notions are discussed in the context of alternatives. To include the 
role of the theorist does not mean reducing science to subjective or sociological terms. On the 
contrary, second-order science would provide a more complete portrait of nature. The work of 
cosmologist Lee Smolin is discussed as a candidate example of second-order cosmology. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The awareness of awareness presents a familiar “second order” to the primary external 
focus of human cognition. As a form of cognition, science could be similarly reflexive, 
complementing its usual subject-object orientation. Dropping the traditional unilateral 
relationship to the material world could open up new avenues of research in physics and 
cosmology.   
 The distinction between first and second order is imported from cybernetics1, 
which is concerned with circular processes of control involving goals and feedback. 
(Heylighen 1979). Though it does not widely appear in fields not concerned with such 
processes or the participatory role of the observer, the terms can be adapted to physical 
science. Accordingly, I propose that first-order science studies the object by excluding 
the subject, while second-order science also studies the role of the subject/theorist in 
formulating the theoretical object, which involves an interactive control process. Two 
background questions to keep in mind are: in what situations should natural physical 
systems be considered cybernetic systems, and when is it appropriate to consider the 
scientific observer’s influence on the system, including conceptual as well as physical 
influence?  
 While physics typically deals with systems from which the observer stands apart, 
unconsidered, study of the universe as a whole must by definition include the observer, at 
least as a physical presence. Cosmology is a highly theoretical science, dependent on 
long chains of inference often based on the evidence of a few photons of light. Its 
speculations can border on metaphysics, and its methods are sometimes controversial, as 
in the use of anthropic reasoning. It is often concerned with fundamental questions, such 
as the self-organization of the universe and the ultimate horizons of knowledge. For such 
                                                
1 The French term cybernétique was apparently coined by Ampére in 1834, in a treatise on 
government, based on Plato’s use of kybernetikes. The English cybernetics was introduced by 
Norbert Wiener in 1948. [Wikipedia: cybernetics] 
reasons, the theorist is highly involved conceptually and it is appropriate to include 
analysis of this involvement in the science itself.  
 An obvious concern, however, is whether a second-order approach is feasible 
without obstructing the primary aim to study nature. I answer in the positive, adding that 
first-order approaches have clarified physical systems in select ways at the cost of 
obfuscating them in others. In many situations the science would be improved by deeper 
analysis of the theorist’s involvement. I hope to convince the reader that a second-order 
approach is essential in some contexts for further progress. Overall, a second-order 
science would be a more complete science—more, not less, “objective.” 
 A sweeping effect of the Scientific Revolution, nevertheless, was to redefine 
natural philosophy as first-order science. Though there are relevant historical as well as 
metaphysical reasons for this, the history and sociology of science must remain largely 
peripheral to this brief exploration, which will focus on how certain assumptions today 
may limit thought in cosmology. Following some general topics, I will note a few such 
assumptions whose exploration might be proper to a second-order science. Then I will 
examine some of the work of cosmologist Lee Smolin, especially as set forth in his 
admirable popular book The Life of the Cosmos, as a candidate example of second-order 
cosmology.    
 
 
What is 2nd-order physical science? 
 
Classical physics is the paradigm of a first-order science, in which the physical world, 
and not physics or the physicist, is the object of study. This focus reflects the outward 
focus of the organism motivated to take an interest in its environment, whose cognition is 
part of its strategy for survival. This very realization, however, establishes a reflexive 
point of view for theorists, who have the opportunity to consider their own activities in 
the light of such concepts. And, while individual sciences may adhere to first-order 
description, the notion of science in the large suggests a human enterprise as well as a 
body of knowledge. On the other hand, one of the ways a given discipline can maintain 
itself as a first-order science is through the clear delineation of its subject matter in 
contrast to other specialized disciplines.   
 Yet, every inquiry leads naturally beyond its borders. Physics is now positioned to 
struggle with grand questions, such as how the universe as a whole could have arisen. 
Yet, to answer such questions scientifically may require more than extending and joining 
existing bodies of knowledge, and more than a new theory or ontology, framed within 
current terms. The grand questions concern not only what exists (the object) but also how 
the theoretical observer (the subject) relates to it. For, in the case of the universe as a 
whole, the observer can no longer be presumed to stand outside the system observed. At 
the other end of the size scale, the Measurement Problem in quantum physics seems also 
to implicate the observer’s participatory role. Ultimately, both call into question the 
traditional separation of subject and object.  
 Nevertheless, the tendency of first-order science is to maintain a certain closure, so 
that all questions remain amenable to objective description. This means, for instance, that 
the participation of the observer is considered only in terms of physical effects, as another 
element of the physical system. A second-order science, in contrast, would explore the 
role of the observer-theorist qua subject. While 1st-order science applies fixed rules and 
premises, 2nd-order science puts these in play as new “variables.” 
 Reflexive consciousness involves self-reference, mixed domains, differing logical 
levels. Hence, it notoriously entails paradox and confusion. Its inclusion in mathematical 
logic spelled the end of the program to formalize all of mathematics. No doubt this is one 
reason for physical science to avoid self-reference by excluding the subject. This 
exclusion cannot get around the obvious contradiction of an observer standing outside the 
universe, nor the complementary recursion of an observer within the observer. A 2nd-
order science must steer between these shoals, embracing both subject and object 
conjointly, in such a way that reduces to the “special case” of a 1st-order description when 
the object is considered in isolation from the subject. A 2nd-order cosmology would 
incorporate reflection on its own methodology and primitive assumptions, a practice that 
was once integral to the study of nature, when science was known as natural philosophy.2  
 One reason the distinction is not more widely used today may be that the concept of 
cybernetic system is difficult to apply outside engineering, biology, sociology, or 
economics. These areas of study involve agency among and within the objects of study, 
but do not necessarily include the agency of the theorist in the description of the 
cybernetic system. On the other hand, studying the concepts and methods used to 
represent phenomena in theories should be universally meaningful. Accordingly, this 
inclusion is the sense of “second order” I will focus on. Yet, it may be useful as well in 
cosmology to consider agency within various self-organizing systems, such as galaxies. It 
could be interesting to explore how terms such as “allopoietic” and “autopoietic” may or 
may not apply to such systems. A related question is to what extent inanimate nature is 
truly “inert” or “passive”, as traditionally assumed.  
 Heylighen (2001: 9) distinguishes two kinds of circularity. Non-linear processes 
and physical feedback loops involve a single logical level, while paradoxes of self-
reference have to do with multiple levels. Hence, scientific intervention may affect the 
phenomenon physically but also conceptually. The first possibility can be accommodated 
within 1st-order description, but not the other. Quantum measurement is an example of 
interaction with physical effects. However, the interpretation of quantum measurement is 
controversial even among physicists, so that it is also a 2nd-order question.  
 2nd-order physical science should not be restricted to physical effects. Some notions 
drawn from 2nd-order cybernetics may transfer generally to physical science.3 For 
instance: the notion that science can be usefully expanded by including the observer as 
part of the system; that 2nd-order theory can direct how 1st-order theories should be used; 
and that 2nd-order science could be more accurate than 1st-order science. (Umpleby 2011). 
                                                
2 Early Greek philosophers had developed a number of second-order concepts. Greek thought was 
characterized by a novel reflection on its own innovations, which included deductive method and 
axiomatic proof in mathematics, geometrical models in astronomy, and causal theories of disease 
in medicine. (Schiefsky 2012: 1). Even throughout the middle ages, there was little separation of 
1st-order and 2nd-order concerns.  
3 Kenny (2009: 100) cautions against the tendency even of 2nd-order cyberneticists to backslide 
into a 1st-order approach. This includes the danger that the meta-perspective takes on the same 
overconfidence characterizing 1st-order science, or objectifies its domain in the manner of naïve 
realism.  
 
As a theory of information and regulation, cybernetics might help to clarify physics 
concepts such as “information” and “entropy”, which currently exclude the role of the 
observer.  
  
Science as cognition 
 
Science is viewed here as a form of human cognition, affirming the basic premise that all 
cognition necessarily involves both subject and object. (One speaks of subject and object 
in the human context, but the same conjoint relationship may be expressed in terms of 
organism and environment, for example.) Like cognition generally, science is an 
interactive process, which nevertheless tends to focus outwardly on the object—the 
world. By convention, 1st-order science does not consider its own modeling processes, 
nor the agent doing the modeling, as part of the system modeled. Despite enormous 
successes, there are drawbacks to this restrictive approach, which deals with artificially 
defined systems to which human agency remains extraneous. Despite the external focus, 
the actual objects of scientific study necessarily are various scientific constructs, whether 
experimental or theoretical. In that sense, science is a self-contained enterprise that only 
obliquely refers to nature. This by no means sets it apart from ordinary cognition, insofar 
as the organism may also be said to deal immediately with its own processes, and only 
indirectly with external reality.  
 Science is both an organ of cognition and a social system. It is guided both by the 
reality of nature and by human needs and desires. Certainly most physical scientists 
would insist that it is as objective as humanly possible. They might concede that the role 
of theory is model making or prediction, yet as human beings they likely care about truth 
and reality as well. As components of social systems, moreover, scientific institutions and 
individual scientists may defend against threats to their own professional goals and to the 
scientific enterprise. 
 Like other cognition, science tends to relate to its constructs as though dealing 
directly with the world itself. While this strategy is no doubt adaptive, the human 
organism has evolved a secondary capacity, to address problems that arise from such 
projection—whether personal, social, or scientific. This capacity is the awareness that we 
are aware, and that our perception is not an open window on the world but mediated by 
cognitive processes that reflect not only structure in the world but also the structure, 
needs, and motivations of the organism. This second-order awareness has obvious 
advantages for a social creature, to temper natural impulses and reactivity based on naïve 
faith in the fidelity of perception. It also has advantages for a technological creature, 
since it establishes an inner workspace for imagination, language, culture, and tool 
making. Since science and technology are developments of this inner workspace, it is 
reasonable to challenge their exclusion of subjectivity. 
 While it appears that the world is knowable (and livable) because nature obeys 
rational principles and hierarchical laws, it is reasonable to wonder to what extent these 
reflect human preferences and thought patterns. The ongoing task is to sort out what is 
intrinsic to the world from projections upon it. In one sense, 1st-order science claims to 
have done this long ago, simply by eliminating secondary qualities from its ontology and 
subjective elements from its method, as originally prescribed by the Enlightenment 
fathers. Yet there may be subtler ways in which the scientist remains embedded in 
cognitive biases that shape the terms of scientific investigation.  
 Knowing the object always involves a knowing subject. 1st-order science deals 
with the paradox of knowing “the world in itself” by attempting to bracket the observing 
subject, as an insubstantial fly on the wall outside the system observed. However, while 
physics regularly treats of idealized systems, isolated from each other and from the 
physical influence of the observer, there are no such things in nature. Moreover, 
“systems” can only be identified at all in accord with human purposes. How nature carves 
itself is another question. While it is the question ostensibly asked by 1st-order science, a 
more adequate answer should be possible by considering the purposes behind the guise of 
objectivity. Current approaches, still based on mechanism, treat nature in terms that are 
clearly matters of human definition. Yet, it may be meaningful to ask: how, and in what 
sense, might nature define itself? The question bears promise for understanding not only 
nature but also the process of theorizing.  
 Physical science rarely asks such questions because of a long-standing prejudice in 
favor of the active “spiritual” (read: disembodied) nature of the human agent, and against 
active powers of agency within nature. Consistent with the mechanist metaphor, physics 
has traditionally dealt with inorganic matter as passively deterministic, lacking inherent 
powers of self-organization. This bias goes back to early Greek thought, to the religious 
origins of science, perhaps even to the genetically conditioned male psyche. It may be an 
adaptive trait, insofar as it serves technical mastery. The fact, that the 1st-order approach 
works to produce the technological miracle, may be a strong argument not to muddle 
science with self-reference or too much philosophy. However, the 1st-order approach 
does not work uniformly, even in science. In particular, it reaches limits in cosmology, in 
quantum theory, and in questions of self-organization generally. It may also have reached 
its limit as a strategy of the species, to the extent it creates a dangerously distorted 
relationship to nature. 
 A scientific consequence of the exclusion of the subject from 1st-order science is 
that agency within nature remains problematic and neglected. For, the one-way 
relationship of subject to object means that the object is no subject or agent. Because we 
are used to identifying agency with human or divine actors, or at least with creatures 
manifesting intentionality, we tend to lack a category of agency that is independent of 
these references. A spinoff of a more reflexive science could be an expanded concept of 
agency and a broader perspective on self-organization.  
  
 
Historical prolegomenon to a 2nd-order physical science  
 
In its origins, science was shaped by belief in a creator God, by medieval interest in 
machines, by discoveries of new lands and natural riches, and by ancient Greek 
rationalism. Such factors conspired toward a mechanistic view of the natural world, as 
the object of a one-way relationship. The scientific observer was implicitly external to the 
world investigated, just as the Creator was separate from his Creation, and the mind from 
the objects of its attention. Scientific laws were interpreted as divine decrees over a 
subservient nature. Accordingly, the scientific object of study became the “isolated 
system”, a theoretical artifact defined and governed by mathematical laws presumed to 
transcend it. These were usually parameterized as functions of “time”, defined by a clock 
also artificial and external to the system. In the large, such idealized elements functioned 
much as other cultural artifacts do: namely, to redefine the world in human terms. 
(Bruiger 2006). The fact that no natural system is actually well-defined or isolated from 
the rest of the universe could be disregarded in view of success at predicting the course of 
phenomena that corresponded well enough to definitions to allow the formulation of 
mathematical laws. A price was paid, however, since for two centuries only such 
phenomena were then sought out for study.  
 The observer too was standardized and interchangeable, through an exclusive focus 
on “primary qualities”—ultimately, variables of position and their time derivatives. 
Observation was essentially visual, despite the fact that notions such as “force” and 
“temperature” refer to other sense modalities. Ideally, the observer should have no 
physical influence on observation. However, astronomical distances could not be 
measured with rulers but depended on information remotely transmitted by light. The 
finite rate of its transmission posed problems over great distances, especially for rapidly 
moving sources, leading eventually to the theory of relativity. This was the first 
indication that the physical circumstance of the observer needed to be taken into account. 
The second came soon after, with quantum theory, which confronted the finite texture of 
light.  
 Further developments helped to undermine traditional expectations: the 
development of cybernetics, the new disciplines of complexity and chaos, and of high-
energy and low-temperature physics, and new understandings in biology, ecology, and 
brain science. These suggested limits of notions like the isolated system, hinting not only 
at the scientist’s participation, but also the participation of all things in all other things. 
Modern physics concepts such as entanglement, decoherence, and non-locality point to 
an essential wholeness even in the non-living world. While the advance of theory and 
technology expanded the range and sensitivity of observation, there was still no call for a 
2nd-order approach, featuring the conceptual involvement of the theorist in the scientific 
narrative. Physics could be reflexive on the level of physical influences, channeled into 
1st-order description, but any other meta-analysis was generally left to philosophers. 
 This situation changed with the merger of fundamental physics and cosmology. The 
very meaning of “isolated system” changes when the universe is the only truly isolated 
system. Traditional notions concerning observation and the reality of objects are 
challenged by quantum phenomena. In both realms, more is at stake than the physical 
inclusion of the observer. For, there are persistent conceptual difficulties in quantum 
theory, the Standard Model of particle physics, and the Big Bang model of cosmology. 
These challenges include the measurement problem, the enormous discrepancy between 
predicted and observed values of the “vacuum energy”, various “fine-tuning problems”, 
and the related mystery of the universe’s entropic history (which may involve “dark 
energy”). They suggest that physical science could profit by reclaiming some of the 
duties heretofore abandoned to philosophy. Indeed, this is already happening in such 
venues as the Santa Fe Institute and the Perimeter Institute, where disciplines cross-
pollinate, and in such popular formats as Edge and Youtube, as well as in the writings of 
scientists for popular consumption.4 It is already happening in the theoretical work of 
cosmologists such as Lee Smolin. Yet, with notable exceptions, it has not yet generally 
penetrated academia.  
 
 
The closure of 1st-order science 
 
First-order description is strictly an account of events in the physical world. While this 
closure obviously serves to keep physicists within the bounds of physics, it also 
represents a ceiling to the kind and the terms of reflection that may be undertaken. 
Symptoms of this ceiling include what Kenny (2009: 103) calls “epistemological 
cheating”—the recycling of a domain of description to serve as its own cause or 
rationale. For instance, though the physical world may be cognized differently by various 
actual or theoretical organisms, we take our way of cognizing it as the actual world, 
which is then (circularly) supposed to be the objective cause of our cognition and that of 
other creatures. Our way of telling the story of the world serves as the standard reference, 
the transcendent domain from which are derived all possible other versions. It is 
commonly assumed that mathematical theories of physics describe this domain. But that 
article of faith simply defers to another: the transcendent reality and universality of 
mathematics, which (whatever else it is) is another construct.5  
 The notion of indefinite theoretical possibilities other than what we perceive entails 
a need to position our human selves as cognitive agents within this “landscape” of 
possible worlds. Toward that end, for example, a typical 1st-order account would focus on 
objective events leading to the type of universe harboring observers. The cognition of 
observers simply adapts to the conditions of such a universe and plays no physical role in 
setting them. (Hartle 2010: 15-16). Any other kind of role is not discussed, so that despite 
reference to observers it remains a 1st-order description. Smolin (1997: 266) comments 
on this approach: “it is possible to perceive the world in classical terms because it is 
highly organized… There must be something essential… about the fact that the world is 
complex.” One might add: there must be something essential (to the classical view) about 
how the human psyche perceives the world; and there must be something to be gained 
scientifically by considering how evolutionary history shapes scientific thought and its 
categories.  
 The recognition of mathematical possibility beyond what is seen to exist has often 
led to the discovery of new phenomena. Perhaps, analogously, the recognition of broader 
“cognitive possibility” could also lead to new discovery. Physics is highly mathematical, 
and it is reasonable for physicists to believe in the guidance of mathematics. Yet, 
                                                
4 Perhaps one reason why scientists are motivated to write such books, ostensibly to share their 
work with a wider audience, is also to provide a forum for their more philosophical views, which 
would be considered out of place in the 1st-order accounts of journals. 
5 Of course, many mathematicians and physicists (beginning with Plato) insist that mathematics is 
a transcendent realm, with a special relationship to physical reality, such that even aliens would 
recognize the same mathematical truths that we do. (Tegmark 2007). Yet, clearly the transcendent 
status of mathematics is the notion of an embodied creature. How aliens might view this situation, 
or what their mathematics might include, cannot be known a priori.  
mathematics does not usually take us outside the first order.6 If physics is a form of 
cognition, then perhaps it is also reasonable to believe in the guidance of cognitive 
theory, evolutionary psychology, and what might be termed abstract epistemology.  
 Another effect of 1st-order closure involves the faith that we should be able to 
understand complex, non-linear processes in terms of familiar deterministic models. Self-
organizing processes are presumed to involve extensions of known reductionist 
mechanisms. Yet, the search for the simple linear relationships behind such models 
developed for historical more than logical reasons: that’s what could be done with the 
intellectual resources available. We now have access to vastly improved resources—the 
digital computer, in particular—that enable the study of non-linear processes and greater 
complexity. We are only beginning to entertain a mentality to match.   
 
 
A science of questioning assumptions 
 
A 2nd-order science may escape 1st-order closure by considering certain intuitive notions, 
which Gerald Holton called “thematic content.” These are “preconceptions that appear to 
be unavoidable for scientific thought, but are themselves not verifiable or falsifiable” 
(Holton 1988: 13). They form a third “dimension” of scientific practice, beside the usual 
analytic and empirical aspects characterizing 1st-order science. Many such thematic 
elements were already incorporated in early Greek thought—such as reduction, 
invariance, deductive reason, geometric modeling, symmetry, and technological 
metaphors. (Schiefsky 2012: 3). While some may appear self-evident even today, every 
identifiable assumption entails alternatives worth considering. A classic example from 
mathematics is the self-evident truth of Euclidean geometry, alternatives to which were 
only developed when the parallel postulate was relaxed. In this section I identify, as 
examples, several such “themata” often associated with 1st-order science.  
 
1. Reification is a psychological action that often keeps discussion at a 1st-order level. 
Processes and relationships are conceived as things, issues are framed in ontological 
rather than epistemic terms.   
 
2. The principle of sufficient reason suggests there should be an answer to every 
reasonable question about why the world is as it is. Its success in familiar realms bears no 
guarantee of a priori truth, nor of application in other realms. Similarly, the identity of 
indiscernables depends on the possibility to enumerate all properties or relations shared 
in common. Yet, an unequivocal list of defining properties or relations is only possible 
within a deductive system (a model). Leibniz’ two principles already assume that the 
world is such a system. 
 To specify measurable quantities as the pertinent variables faithfully representing 
the real properties of a system (even including the investigating apparatus) begs the 
question of how well such factors can be separated from each other and from information 
                                                
6 The reason, I believe, is that mathematics, in its empirical origins, abstracts general properties 
of physical reality, and hence generally reflects a first-order point of view. Gödel’s theorems are 
an obvious exception. And, I do not mean, of course, that mathematics would play no role in a 
second-order science.  
that is already presumed irrelevant. (Mets 2012: 183) It may be that the physical variables 
of a theory are neither exclusive nor exhaustive, or do not even pick out clearly 
identifiable properties. Defining them mathematically, on the other hand, renders them 
definite and complete, masking the ambiguities involved in the experimental or 
observational set-up, which include shielding, interpretation of signals, statistical spreads, 
etc. (Cartwright 1999: 152).   
 
3. Deductionism is the credo that nature can be formally modeled, even exhaustively, by 
defined constructs. Reductionism reduces to deductionism, since it reduces reality to 
defined parts of some model—a deductive system. While such things are not found in 
nature, their appeal no doubt lies in offering of a complete, certain, and unqualified 
account—through fiat and logical consistency rather than empirical evidence. 
 The perennial dream of a completed theoretical science assumes that physical 
reality is exhaustible in thought, that there must be a bottom to the complexity of matter 
and an end to inquiry about the fundamentals, if not the details, of physical reality. It 
assumes that the world is something definite, with a calculable information content, and 
can be fully captured in mathematical expressions. Though such assumptions may be 
functionally grounded in our evolutionary history, the question of their truth is 
appropriate for a 2nd-order science and bears on contemporary issues in cosmology.7    
  
4. The mathematization of science reflects the fruitfulness of mathematics for the study of 
nature, so taken for granted that many now assume that physical reality consists literally 
of mathematics. Platonism aside, mathematics is a descriptive tool. The purposes for 
which it is used, and its syntax as the language of science, influence our concepts of 
nature and relationship to it. Yet these influences tend to go unrecognized in 1st-order 
accounts—indeed, within our culture. The assumption that natural reality can be captured 
in the special idealizations to which mathematics applies is a corollary of the belief that 
reality can be contained in human definitions at all. There may be a scientific price, as 
well as a cultural one, to pay for such oversimplifications.  
 While we marvel at the effectiveness of mathematics to model nature, perhaps the 
true marvel is the general ability of thought to model the external world at all. A general 
theory of intelligence might help account for the astonishing effectiveness of 
mathematics, which would then be situated as one development of a broader evolutionary 
capacity to model, abstract, and generalize. (Baum 2007).  
 
5. Computerization provides not only a powerful new tool for science and society but 
also the contemporary metaphor of nature itself—a neo-mechanist vision. One function 
of a 2nd-order science should be to recognize and compensate for the influence of such 
metaphors, as well as of trends and fads within the scientific community. 
 The computer is psychologically significant because it translates into technology 
an age-old dream to directly configure reality. At the same time, like other tools, the 
computer not only enhances but also channels our perception. It reflects the architecture 
of human thought, which is obviously shaped by nature. While the discrete states of a 
computer are held to depend ultimately on quantum discreteness (Penrose 1989: 403), 
                                                
7 Such as the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and the nature of “information.” 
discreteness is a matter of scale and definition. The computer’s definitional discreteness 
is projected back upon nature as a fundamental property. The architecture of human 
thought, and of the computer in particular, is projected back upon nature as its very 
organization. A different approach may be required to understand nature’s self-
organization. 
  
6. Specious improbability. Many properties of the actual universe, far from equilibrium, 
appear startlingly improbable as the result of a random shuffle of theoretical parameters. 
But this impression involves a dubious metaphor, which attempts to assimilate the 
complexity of the world to artificial situations, such as a role of dice or shuffle of cards. 
Cosmologists calculate the vanishingly negligible probability that a universe supporting 
life could arise from randomly chosen values of parameters of the standard model of 
particle physics or the current model of cosmology. Given one universe, however, such 
calculations seem artificial; the very notion of a randomly generated universe is a 
theoretical fancy. The question of how initial conditions are “selected” is ambiguous, 
since it is unclear who or what is selecting. In the literature, sometimes physical 
processes perform this service, yet sometimes it is the theorist who specifies the initial or 
boundary condition, as in the running of simulations. 
 Selection by chance may be likened to the outcome of unstable equilibrium. It 
seems more reasonable to explain the values of fundamental parameters by looking to 
stable equilibrium—attractor states insensitive to initial conditions. Rather than an 
explanation designed to overcome specious improbabilities, one should seek a scenario in 
which all parameters or initial conditions tend toward the state concerned. Moreover, 
“parameters” must not be seen in isolation; it is the total package that corresponds to the 
attractor state.   
 
7. Ceteris paribus evaluates effects where there are multiple causes, by examining one 
factor at a time. In scientific application, it is an artifact of experimental method, of 
artificial situations designed to allow one factor to vary in isolation from others. 
Computer simulation is a logical extension, since factors in a program are controllable by 
definition. But the universe, so far as we know, is not an artifact, not a simulation, and 
not a laboratory that can be so controlled. Identifiable factors may operate in concert in 
real self-organizing processes, so that changing one necessarily changes others. 
 
8. Premise selection. While there may always be unacknowledged factors at work, no 
explicit meta-rule guides the selection of basic premises in 1st-order theories. It is 
possible, for example, to eliminate either time or space from physical description, but 
only by introducing other concepts subjectively held to be more fundamental. The 
meaning of that discretionary sense of hierarchy, which makes one concept seem more 
fundamental or preferable, deserves to be explored. Perhaps there are frank discussions 
among theorists about the origins of their personal preferences, but these seem to find 
their way, if at all, only into the popular literature.  
  
9. The concept of entropy was devised in terms of useful terrestrial systems. It can be 
problematic when extended to the universe as a whole, and is sufficiently tricky and 
context-dependent to warrant rethinking in cosmology. The modern translation of entropy 
as information seems especially questionable, since information depends on subjects as 
well as objects.  
 
10. The concept of reversibility leads to conundrums such as the arrow of time, or the 
problem of accounting for why events in the real world are irreversible. Deterministic 
systems are generally “reversible” simply because their equations are time-reversible. 
Since there are no deterministic systems in nature, the cost of treating nature 
deterministically is worth exploring.   
  
11. The concept of order depends on context and history. A pile of books on the floor 
may appear disordered, compared to neatly shelved books in alphabetic order. However, 
the appearance of order is relative to the intentions of agents involved. If the books had 
been carefully placed on the floor according to their relevance in a research project, for 
example, their order would be greater or more significant than if they had remained 
alphabetized on the shelf. 
 
12. Time in physics can be highly troublesome, as relativity first showed. Though time as 
a first-order parameter has been thoroughly explored, it remains controversial, even to the 
extent that its reality is disputed or affirmed. (Smolin 2013, 2013a; Barbour 1999). 
Abstract time (like abstract space) is as much a human artifact as the clocks that measure 
it. It is worth exploring why modern physics seeks ultimate reality in such abstractions at 
all. Time is presumed as a background in both classical and quantum physics, even for 
situations in which time-keeping processes cannot be presumed to exist.  
 
 
Toward 2nd-order Cosmology: the example of Lee Smolin 
 
Much of Lee Smolin’s work deals with processes of self-organization on a cosmic scale, 
which typically involve regulatory feedback mechanisms, such as autocatalytic cycling of 
energy and material in spiral galaxies. (Smolin 1997:130). He also questions current basal 
assumptions prevalent in the physics community, and often writes with unusual personal 
candor. There is much reason, therefore, to view his thought as going beyond typical 1st-
order science. My intent here is not to evaluate his ideas, but to use their example to 
explore what a 2nd-order cosmology might look like and some obstacles to that vision. 
 Smolin’s cosmic natural selection theory addresses what seems to be a simple 
question: why are the fundamental laws and parameters of nature such as they are?8 But 
this question can be interpreted in two ways, according to whether one is inquiring about 
the world or about the human process of formulating laws and their parameters. The first 
regards what nature brings to our scientific portrait of it; the second, what the human 
enterprise of science brings. These approaches are complementary, representing the 
partnership of subject and object. The usual contribution of the scientist may include 
elements that (like observer interference) can be accommodated within a 1st-order 
                                                
8 The basic idea of the theory is that a new universe can emerge from the collapse of a black hole; 
it would then in turn contain black holes that could generate further universes. The kind of 
universe that would prevail would have parameters that maximize the number of black holes, on 
the model of Darwinian selection, explaining why we live in a “typical” universe.  
framework. These might even include the design and execution of experiments, methods 
of data analysis, etc. However, there may also be the sort of unacknowledged 
contribution of theoretical assumptions and biases mentioned in the previous section, 
along with omission of certain kinds of question. For example, Smolin (1997: 26) raises 
this 1st-order question: “what must be true about the universe in order that it contain 
living things?” A complementary (2nd-order) question would be: what must be true about 
living things that shapes how humans do cosmology? While Smolin does not ask this 
question, he does often raise philosophical issues that cross a line between a 1st-order and 
2nd-order approach. 
 Smolin (1997: 176; 2013: 123) proposes a universe that makes and tunes itself, 
challenging the notion of an externally configured world. A central fact for him is that 
there can be no observer outside the universe as a whole—contrary to the arrangement on 
which 1st-order science is normally predicated. He questions the usual assumption that 
universal regularities (such as the mass or charge of the election) must reflect “principle” 
rather than evolutionary history. He goes on to comment: “A model is just a game, meant 
to mimic some aspect of the world whose observed regularities can be posited in some 
simple rules.” (1997: 181) While this bears no explicit reference to an agent, clearly 
someone plays the game, someone intends for it to mimic the world, someone posits 
rules.  
 He wavers, however, when he raises philosophical issues involving the role of the 
subject or agent but does not follow through. In a sense, he is merely sticking to the point, 
to support his theory of cosmic natural selection. Yet, I cannot help thinking that the 
general cause of self-organization he champions would be furthered by elaborating the 
discussion he only broaches. Smolin rejects the tradition holding that “the world we see 
around us is… only a kind of movie constructed by our eyes” (1997: 196), yet stops short 
of conceding that physics is also a construction, an alternative “movie.” The aspect of an 
absolute perspective he rejects is limited to “timeless” (i.e., non-evolving) laws, for 
which he substitutes an absolute time in which laws evolve. While he notes the 
psychological motivation to escape time, the great tyrant, an unacknowledged greater 
tyrant is contingency, which broadly implicates cognitive strategies of the embodied 
creature to deal with its vulnerability.  
 Smolin proposes increasing order in the universe as a measure of time, inverting the 
19th-century thermodynamic arrow of time. (2013: 249). A model of self-organization 
driven by gravity displaces the old model of diffusing heat. While this shift can be 
attributed to new knowledge, it’s worth dwelling (in hindsight) more generally on how 
new models based on new technology produce new metaphors that shape the current 
scientific vision. Lessons there should make us wary of the current obsession with 
computation and information as the basis of a new ontology of physics. 
 A 2nd-order approach would question the belief that reason can penetrate to an 
absolute reality. This could have led Smolin in a different direction than a metaphysically 
suspect resurgence of absolute time. He understandably opts for a theory he can defend as 
scientific. The theory rests on an analogy with Darwinian selection—relying on “small 
changes” from one generation to the next. Known causal mechanisms account for 
mutations in biology, but Smolin proposes no causal analogue to account for changes in 
fundamental parameters from one generation of universe to another; nor does he provide 
a rationale for why the changes would be small. He points out that this does not 
disqualify the theory from having falsifiable consequences, yet the metaphysical 
framework is as extravagant as it is in those other accounts involving multiple universes 
that he rejects.  
 For Smolin, laws are not eternal, but “constructed in time through physical 
processes.” (1997: 188). The notion of eternal laws he rejects was thinkable in the context 
of the religious and classical heritages of science, but might never have arisen in a 
science embracing a metaphor of organism, instead of mechanism, in the first place. A 
view of matter as inherently self-organizing would not have fostered a science based on 
laws independent of matter and governing it somehow externally. The notion of laws 
“constructed in time through physical processes” has an odd ring, because it is theorists 
who construct laws, while nature simply changes—in recognizable patterns that may 
themselves be changing.  
 A similar example (Smolin 1997: 194) of such ambiguity concerns the nature of 
rationality and the rationality of nature: “there is good reason to hope… that a universe 
hospitable to our own existence… can be rationally comprehended without any need to 
refer to external agency or intelligence.” Yet, one may ask, can it be comprehended 
without reference to human agency and intelligence—which remains “external” in 1st-
order science? As Smolin suggests, nature should be comprehensible to us because we 
are part of it, not because we are made in the image of a rational god who is not part of it. 
Yet, precisely because we are embedded in it, are we not co-responsible for the very 
appearance of rationality that makes it seem comprehensible? Ours is the agency that 
posits eternal laws (and gods), for reasons that have as much to do with the needs of the 
human organism as with the rationality of nature. The very concept of rationality is a 
human category to examine in evolutionary terms.  
 Smolin (1997: 253) notes that when “we observe some part of the world, we 
become entangled with it in the same way that any two particles that interact become 
entangled, so that a complete description of ourselves is impossible without incorporating 
the other.” However, assimilating epistemic entanglement to quantum entanglement is a 
way of managing a 2nd-order issue in 1st-order terms. To pass beyond the confines of 
those terms one must add: and vice-versa! A complete description of the world is 
impossible without incorporating ourselves as cognizing agents, not only as objects of 
cognition.  
 In another paper (1995: 31) he observes that, “with most choices of parameters a 
world would not have the complexity of ours.” Discussion of alternative worlds is 
common coin in modern cosmology, as it was in the Middle Ages, to explain why the 
world is the way it is rather than some other way. Yet, one has to wonder whether 
multiplying worlds is too high a price to pay for explanatory leverage. Moreover, the 
issue is framed in 1st-order terms that avoid discussion of underlying assumptions. It is 
one thing for a programmer to choose which values of parameters to plug into computer 
models; it is quite another to assert that nature does this.  
 For Smolin, cosmic natural selection picks out which of many equally consistent 
possible worlds we actually find ourselves in. He sees that the hard problems of particle 
physics and of cosmology are intimately connected through the values of fundamental 
parameters, which involve “unnatural choices”—by which he means against all odds. 
While it is an interesting theory, for me there remains an unresolved basic issue 
concerning the ambiguous notion of “choice.” Is it nature or the theorist who chooses? 
Keeping the theory at the 1st-order level masks this question. Causality in the world is not 
distinguished from the theorist’s intentionality. Moreover, if something is actually the 
case, then in what sense is it “unnatural”? It strikes me as more unnatural to posit a 
multiplicity of universes and an absolute time to contain them.   
 The same paper (Smolin 1995: 43) argues that both relativity and quantum theory 
require a world of a certain complexity. The argument develops an idea of Leibniz, that 
complexity depends on the unique identity of locations, which can be distinguished by 
what is visible from them. Smolin attempts to quantify a notion of variety based on this 
scheme. The interesting thing for this discussion is that, as with Leibniz’ monads, points 
of space-time in his treatment can be thought of either as particles or as observers. The 
question, of whether and how to dissolve the distinction between subject and object, 
requires a place for such speculation in the realm of 2nd-order science. 
 
 
Future directions 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests several possibilities for future research: 
 
1. Cosmologists could embrace the working assumption that the material world has 
unrecognized mechanisms of self-organization. They could look for analogies in 
biological science: e.g., the role in reproduction of “junk” DNA and environment, as 
opposed to genome, or the role of glial cells in the brain. The notions of cybernetic 
system and autopoiesis could tentatively be applied to galaxy formation, nucleosynthesis, 
the role of gravitation and entropy in early history of the universe, etc.    
 
2. Physical scientists could extend the notion of observer influence to include conceptual 
as well as physical influences. They could look to cognitive theory, evolutionary 
psychology, and evolutionary epistemology for inspiration. An abstract notion of 
“cognitive possibility” could provide guidance, on the model of mathematical possibility 
(where equations allow “unphysical” solutions): how might an alien physicist approach 
the problem? 
 
3. At observational limits, both cosmology and quantum theory deal with weak signals, 
statistical interpretation, and long chains of inference—ideal ground for “observer 
influence.” Scientists in these fields could look to stages of cognitive processing for 
suggestive analogies.  
 
4. Scientists in general could inquire how standard practices of idealization and 
mathematical modeling constrain both theory and observation. They could profitably 
question the meaning of observation and measurement in their fields, the participatory 
role of the theorist or experimentalist, and other basic assumptions taken for granted. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The merger of high energy physics with modern cosmology points to limits of a 1st-order 
approach based on an external observer. Though physical science traditionally clung to 
description of the object, the domain of discussion can now productively expand to 
include the subject’s role in the co-creation, with nature, of the scientific narrative. 
Acknowledging the partnership between subject and object enhances the objectivity of an 
account, with the traditional benefits of prediction and control. Subjectivity is a defining 
fact of human life and consciousness; far from posing a threat, it is an essential glue of 
society and the real basis of whatever objectivity is humanly possible. In cosmology in 
particular, expanding the domain of discussion might open the door to a broader 
treatment of agency in the non-living world, shedding new light on self-organization. 
 I do not believe that a final theory will “bring to an end… the ancient search for 
those principles that cannot be explained in terms of deeper principles.” (Weinberg 1992: 
18). Nor is an ideal of theoretical completeness feasible that requires a one-to-one 
mapping between theory and natural reality. (Einstein et. al. 1935). Rather, a complete 
theory would be one that includes the role of the scientist in creating theories and 
experiments. Such reflexivity would of itself forever eliminate the possibility of a final 
theory. On the other hand, if fundamental physics does reach finality through some 
consensus, its subsequent natural direction would be toward self-reflection, perhaps 
relaxing requirements such as quantification, prediction, and the exclusion of 
“secondary” qualities. Such a science might be better positioned to understand the 
relation of “mind” to “body.”    
 We have examined some of the subtleties involved in what might constitute a 
second-order cosmology, using the example of Lee Smolin’s theory of cosmic natural 
selection. Professor Smolin asks: “If not for the philosophers, who is going to have the 
courage to tell the physicists when quantum theory, or another of our constructions, just 
cannot be made sense of?” (1997: 195) Undoubtedly he has this courage. Yet our answer 
should be that such soul searching ought to be more widely incorporated into physical 
science itself. The objectivity that is the ideal of first-order science ultimately means 
adequacy in the evolutionary landscape. In that respect, for human civilization and 
current science in particular, the jury is mercifully still out. 
 
______________________  
REFERENCES 
 
Barbour J. (1999) The end of time: the next revolution in physics. Oxford UP, New York 
 
Baum E. (2007) A working hypothesis for general intelligence. Proc. of the 2007 
conference on advances in artificial general intelligence.  
 
Bruiger D. (2006) Second nature: the man-made world of idealism, technology and 
power. Trafford/Left Field Press, Victoria, BC 
 
Cartwright N. (1999) The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of science. 
Cambridge UP, Cambridge, MA 
 
Foerster H. von (1979) Cybernetics of cybernetics.  
[https://www.academia.edu/5994177/Cybernetics_of_Cybernetics] 
 
Hartle J.B. (2010) The quasiclassical realms of this quantum universe. 
[http://arxiv.org/pdf/0806.3776.pdf] 
 
Heylighen F. (2001) Cybernetics and second-order cybernetics. In: Meyers R.A. (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of physical science & technology (3rd ed.), Academic Press, New York,  
 
Heylighen F. (2014) Principia cybernetica web: web dictionary of cybernetics and 
systems. [http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/INdexASC.html] 
 
Holton G. (1988) Thematic origins of scientific thought: Kepler to Einstein. Harvard UP, 
Cambridge, MA/London 
 
Kenny V. (2009) There’s nothing like the real thing’: revisiting the need for a third-order 
cybernetics. Constructivist Foundations. 4(2) 
[http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal]  
 
Mets A. (2012) Measurement theory, nomological machine and measurement 
uncertainties (in classical physics). Studia Philosophica Estonia 5(2)  
 
Penrose R. (1989) The emperor’s new mind: concerning computers, minds, and the laws 
of physics. Oxford UP/Penguin, New York   
 
Schiefsky M. (2012) The creation of second-order knowledge in ancient Greek science as 
a process in the globalization of knowledge. In: Renn J. (ed.) The globalization of 
knowledge in history, Open Access Edition  
 
Smolin L. (1995) Cosmology as a problem in critical phenomena.  
[http://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9505022.pdf]  
 
Smolin L. (1997) The life of the cosmos. Oxford UP, Oxford/New York 
 
Smolin L. (2013a) Temporal Naturalism. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1310.8539.pdf] 
 
Smolin L. (2013) Time reborn: from the crisis in physics to the future of the universe. 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston/New York   
 
Tegmark M. (2007) The mathematical universe. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.0646v2.pdf] 
 
Umpleby S. (2011) Second-order science: logic, strategies, methods. (power point 
presentation) [www.gwu.edu/~umpleby/recent_papers/2011/wmsci_sos3.ppt] 
 
Weinberg S. (1992) Dreams of a final theory. Pantheon books, New York 
 
 
